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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN C. DAVIS 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs . 
KARL N. WEENIG and JOHN P. 
PORTER, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
I. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a dismissal by the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, State of Utah of Appellant's action. The 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2-2. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction because this 
case was poured over from the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(j) by letter dated October 16, 1992. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
a. Whether the evidence presented at trial supports the 
jury's finding of no proximate cause. 
This Court will not upset a jury verdict unless there is 
a showing that the evidence so clearly preponderates 
against the prevailing party that reasonable people would 
not differ on the outcome of the case. Smith v. Vuicich, 
699 P.2d 763, 764 (Utah 1985). 
b. Whether the law supports the jury's finding of no 
proximate cause. 
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A trial court's statements or conclusions of law are 
accorded not particular deference; we review them for 
correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 
1989). 
c. Whether the court erred in denying plaintiff's Motion for 
new trial. 
In reviewing denial of motions for a directed verdict, 
judgment n.o.v., or in the alternative for a new trial, 
this court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion was made. 
McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1126-1127 (Utah 1977). 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
a. Utah Rules of Procedure 59(a): 
Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on 
all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new 
trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse part, or any order of the court, or abuse 
of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury, and whenever any one or 
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any 
general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such 
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of 
the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action was brought by plaintiff to recover for injuries 
suffered in an automobile accident which occurred on or about May 
25, 1988 and heard before a jury on April 27-30, 1992. The jury 
found defendants one hundred percent (100%) negligent, but with no 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
B. Proceedings and Disposition 
A Complaint was filed herein July 12, 1990. R at 4. Defendants 
answered and requested a jury trial. R at 7, 17. A jury trial was 
held April 27-30, 1992 before the Honorable Boyd L. Park in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for the County of Utah, State 
of Utah. R at 354. The Defendants were found negligent, but that 
there was no proximate cause between plaintiff's injuries and 
defendants' negligence was found by the jury. R at 337. Motion for 
New Trial was filed. R at 290. Order denying new trial was entered 
July 13, 1992. R at 340. Notice of Appeal was filed August 5, 1992. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On May 25, 1988, plaintiff was driving southbound on 
University Avenue at approximately 4000 North when he stopped for 
a red light. R at 354, p. 93. 
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2. Vehicles driven by defendants Karl N. Weenig and John P. 
Porter struck the rear of plaintiff's vehicle. R at 354, p. 95. 
3. Defendants negligently operated their vehicles. R at 337. 
The undisputed facts disclose the following injuries which resulted 
from the accident: 
a. Plaintiff's knee injuries were aggravated by the 
accident. R at 354, pp. 415,488,498; 
b. Plaintiff suffered a subluxation of the joints along 
his back. R at 354, pp. 346-347; 
c. Plaintiff suffered several back injuries prior to 
1984 which were resolved by treatment prior to 1984. R at 354, p. 
373; 
d. Plaintiff was last seen for a back treatment prior 
to the injury in 1986. R at 354, pg 529; 
e. The only expert which performed the objective AMA 
Guideline whole body rating found a twenty percent (20%) whole body 
disability. R at 354, p. 513; 
f . The car accident aggravated plaintiff's preexisting 
Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome. R at 354, p. 599; 
g. The accident aggravated Plaintiff ' s preexisting Post 
Concussional Syndrome by between ten (10%) and forty percent (40%). 
R at 354 p. 617; 
h. Plaintiff's whole body impairment to include the 
mental stress and physical aggravation of the Post Concussional 
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Syndrome was twenty to twenty-one percent (20-21%) without the 
knees being included. R at 354, p. 711; 
i. Defendants' sole medical expert opinion regarding 
back and neck was expressed without having conducted any physical 
or records examination upon which to base an opinion. R at 354, p. 
492. 
4. The court allowed reference to highly prejudicial 
proceedings in this case. R at 354, p. 31. 
5. The jury found defendants one hundred percent (100%) 
negligent. R at 336-337. 
6. The jury found that defendants were not the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. R at 337. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This action was brought about by the negligent conduct of 
defendants in the operation of their motor vehicles. The jury found 
that they had in fact been negligent in hitting plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was found not to have been negligent at all. The only 
credible evidence presented showed that plaintiff was injured as a 
result of the accident. 
In spite of this, the jury found that plaintiff's injuries 
were not the result of the actions of the defendants. Because the 
undisputed competent evidence shows that plaintiff was injured as 
a result of the accident, the jury verdict should be reversed and 
a new trial ordered on proximate cause and damages. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This action arises out of an automobile accident which 
occurred May 25, 1988. R at 354, p. 93. Defendants both slammed 
into the back of plaintiff's vehicle while travelling southbound on 
University Avenue at approximately 4000 North. R at id. The jury 
found the defendants to have been negligent in their actions. R at 
337 . 
On appeal, plaintiff has raised three (3) issues: 
i. Whether the evidence is insufficient to support the jury 
verdict; 
2. Whether, as a matter of law, the jury verdict is not 
supported by the evidence; and 
3. Whether the trial court improperly denied the Motion for 
New Trial. 
In reviewing a jury verdict, great deference is given to that 
verdict. In Smith vs. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985), the court 
held that: 
This court will not upset a jury verdict unless there is 
a showing that the evidence so clearly preponderates 
against the prevailing party that reasonable people would 
not differ on the outcome of the case. Smith, 699 P. 2d at 
764. 
On appeal, therefore, plaintiff must marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury verdict and then demonstrate that such evidence 
is insufficient to support the verdict. Matter of Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
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In raising the issue as to whether, as a matter of law, the 
jury verdict was contrary to the evidence, see Doelle vs. Bradley, 
784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). 
Plaintiff also brought a Motion for New Trial under Rule 
59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in 
material part as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties on ail or part of 
the issues, for any of the following causes:...(6) 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. R at 290 
The trial court denied the Motion for New Trial. (R at 340) In 
McCloud vs. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977), the court held that: 
In reviewing denial of motions for a directed verdict, 
judgment n.o.v., in the alternative for anew trial, this 
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the party against whom the motion was made. In 
reviewing a trial court's exercise of discretion upon a 
motion for a new trial, this court, examines the record 
to determine whether the evidence to support the verdict 
was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing 
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. 
If there be an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision, 
then the denial of the new trial must be affirmed. 
McCloud, 569 P.2d at 1126-1127. 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff will marshal the evidence 
and show that the evidence was so lacking or so slight and 
unconvincing in favor of the denial of proximate cause by the jury, 
that the verdict was plainly unreasonable and unjust. 
II. The Undisputed Evidence Showed Causation of Injury 
Defendants called only one (1) medical expert. Ke performed no 
examination on plaintiff's back or neck. R at 354 p. 492. Neither 
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did he perform an examination with regard to the claimed 
psychological injuries. R at 354, p. 484. He did examine the knee, 
and testified that the accident aggravated the knee injury of 
plaintiff to the amount of five to fifteen percent (5-15%). R at 
354, pp. 488, 498. 
The undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff did not have 
ongoing back problems, but that his back was last adjusted prior to 
the accident in 1986 and not for an injury complaint. R at 354, p. 
529. Prior to that, he was seen in 1984, and all his back problems 
to that time had been resolved. R at 354, p. 373. The undisputed 
evidence shows that plaintiff had an approximate twenty percent 
(20%) whole body permanent rating based upon the objective AMA 
Guidelines. R at 354, pp. 513, 711. 
The physical impairment rating was performed pursuant to the 
AMA Guidelines with an inclinometer to test various ranges of 
motion. R at 354, p. 506. The psychological impairment rating was 
determined by a qualified expert with numerous years of experience. 
R at 354, pp. 701-703. 
Defendants' expert agreed that aggravation of the knee injury 
had occurred due to the accident. R at 354, p. 492. No evidence was 
offered that at least some of plaintiff's back, neck and 
psychological injuries were not a result of the accident. The 
jury's verdict was therefore purely speculative, and not based upon 
the evidence as presented wherein it denied proximate cause of 
plaintiff's twenty percent (20%) 
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permanent partially impairment. The jury's verdict is therefore 
based on insufficient evidence and no reasonable person could have 
reached this decision based upon the evidence as presented. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury's verdict will be upheld unless, based upon the 
marshalled evidence there is insufficient evidence to support that 
verdict. The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff was injured 
as a result of the negligence of defendants. The denial of Motion 
for New Trial should be reversed at this case remanded for 
proceedings consisted herewith. 
DATED this^^day of c O ^ « ^ ^ ., 1992. 
RICKARD/C. COXSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appeiiant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, postage prepaid to: 
Brett G. Pearce William J. Hansen 
Attorney for Defendant Weenig Attorney for Defendant Porter 
RICHARD K. SFRATLEY & ASSOCIATES CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
I0I8-B Atherton Plaza, Suite B202 175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
1992 DATED this^zf^Xday of 
RICHARCC. COXSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appeiiant 
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A, 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APFEALS 
HLED 
JM 19 1993 
STEVEN C. DAVIS 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs . 
KARL N. WEENIG and JOHN P. 
PORTER, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
ADDENDUM 
Case No. 
920654-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action find from a 
preponderance of evidence the answers to the interrogatories or 
questions propounded to us as follows: 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the defendant Karl Weenig was negligent in performing any 
one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged by the 
plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
2. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the negligence of the defendant Karl Weenig was a 
proximate cause of the injuries of plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
3. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the defendant John P. Porter was negligent in performing 
any one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged by the 
plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the negligence of the defendant John P. Porter was a 
proximate cause of the injuries of plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
5. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
-2-
find that the negligence of the plaintiff Steven C. Davis was a 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes • No X 
6. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the negligence of the plaintiff Steven C. Davis was a 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
7. If you have answered any or all of the Questions 2, 
4f and 6 "Yes," then, and only then, answer the following question: 
Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total 100%, what 
percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Defendant Karl Weenig % 
B. Defendant John P. Porter % 
C. Plaintiff Steven C. Davis % 
TOTAL 100% 
8. If you have answered either or both Questions 2 and 
4 "Yes," state the amount of special and general damages, if any, 
sustained by the plaintiff. If neither questions were answered 
"Yes," do not answer this question. 
Special Damages: $ 
General Damages: $ 
TOTAL $ 
WHEREFORE, upon motion of the defendants, and good cause 
-3-
appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
defendants have judgment against the plaintiff on his complaint of 
no cause of action and the defendants are awarded their costs of 
court in the sum of $2,386.30, as is reflected by the Memorandum of 
Costs and Disbursements which has been filed with the Court. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
1 
BOYD L. PARK, District Judge 
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damages , we show you even filed a lawsuit seeking 
compensation for psychological d a m a g e s . Their expert 
comes in and says that they are different. We are happy 
to have them come in and say it that they are different. 
MR. FISHER: What I am saying, Your Honor, I think 
they have a right to ask the question. This exhibit is not 
relevant and it goes too far and it becomes prejudical. 
This document is not relevant. They can ask the question 
have you filed a lawsuit in which you claim 
psychological damages and he can say , "Yes". Then the 
experts are going to testify and show the d i f f e r e n c e . 
MR. HANSEN: Excise the part that isn't relevant. 
MR. FISHER: We have explained that on many many 
o c c a s i o n s . You know it is obviously what is trying 
to be here and it is to confuse the jury. The jury is 
going to be extremely confused by that. 
THE COURT: The document iself may be too prejudicial 
and may not allow that in. Again this is going to be 
hard to tell until we get into the course of the trial. 
The d o c u m e n t , itself, certainly they have a right to 
inquire into that. If their answers come back in such a 
fashion that it appears to be a denial or something of that 
nature then I may allow the document in. 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, if we may. What we would 
propose to do is we can m a k e r e f e r e n c e to the document as I 
1 
31 
day in January of 1986. They had brought this gentleman 
up from Las Vegas. Before I went in there for arraignment, 
he came in and collaborated the whole story that we had 
set forth . At that time, they dismissed all charges. 
Q Now I want to direct your attention to May 25 f 1988 
some three years later is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall what happened that day about 8:00 O'clo 
in the morni ng? 
A I was in route from , I had come down 8th North 
in Orem down to the mouth of Provo Canyon and turned onto 
the old University Avenue coming towards Provo. I was 
approaching the light that was up there north in the river 
bottoms. There were several cars in front of me. I was 
in my pickup truck and approaching a stoplight. My one 
foot was in the clutch and my one foot was on the brake 
when I was struck two times. 
Q Did you actually own that truck? 
A No. 
Q What is the make and model of that truck? 
A It is a Toyota Pickup Truck that had like a camper 
shell in the back of it. It is a regular simple Toyota 
pickup truck about a 1987. 
Q Who is the owner of that pickup? 
A My father. 
93 
1 drawn as your vehicle? 
2 A (witness doing as requested) 
3 Q As you approached the light what happened? 
4 A The light had turned red and I was either totally 
5 stopped or in the process of being stopped with the 
6 vehicles in front of me being stopped too. At which 
7 time, with my foot on the brake and foot on the clutch as 
8 the car came and slammed into me and jarred me forward, 
9 which time I instinctly pushed yery hard on my both pedals 
JO to prevent going forward or just instinctively I guess. 
11 You are already on there. It hit me in the back right wit 
12 and it was a good hit. I guess I was just in the act 
13 of turning to see what had been, what had hit me , at whic 
14 time in this twisted foremat, I got impaced on this side 
15 of the truck. My body basically, my legs flew off from th 
16 came off from the brake and the clutch . My part of 
17 my body was twisting back this other way . My neck came 
18 forward several times and whip lash from that. 
19 Q You can go back up there and sit down if you would 
20 A (witness doing as requested) 
21 Q What caused you to stop on that date? 
22 A Just- -
23 Q Just before the accident what caused you to stop? 
24 A There was a redlight ahead of me. 
25 Q Did you have to stop suddenly? 
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in my office I use which is reactive muscle testing. 
It is kind of a body language where the body gives us 
information. In my test it indicated that when he leaned 
forward to the right direction there was stress on his body. 
I was trying to compensate that by my adjustments. 
Q Now after you made your findings, did you make 
a working diagnosis for Steve? 
A I also did palpation for palpatory tenderness. 
Q What is that? 
A Well, doing ranges, palpating the tissue to see 
if there is swelling. If there has been trauma there and the 
muscles are taught and in spasm and they were in the cervical 
and upper thoracic and lumbar region. Those were basically 
the tests that I performed on that date. 
Q After performing those tests in getting your 
findings did you make a working diagnosis? 
A I did. 
Q What was that diagnosis? 
A Just a moment and I will read it to you. 
Q Okay. 
A I indicatedthsffcliehiad a sprain strain to the cervical 
region , suffering from headaches. He had muscle swelling. 
He had neuralgia . He had disk injury of the cervical 
region. He had neuralgia which is numbness and tingling 
in his upper extremities. He had pain in the neck and 
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the tho rac i c sp ine. He had i n t e r c o s t a l neura lg ia which 
i s pain 'nd some numbness t i n g l i n g between the r i b cage betwe| 
the r i b s . 
My diagnosis to communicate with insurance companies we 
have to use codes and they are generic and very limited. 
To demonstrate a subluxation as chiropractors we work 
with spine and reduce subluxation which are less 
then a dislocation. Dislocation is the complete 
integrity of the joint is gone. Subluxation is less then 
that. I note on one of my codes in my report my secretary 
typed it up has a dislocation of the lumbar spine . With 
the code that we have to use to report this it comes out 
dislocation but in actuality it is a subluxation. It is 
not a complete dislocation. 
Also my diagnosis indicated there is injury to the 
knee and the legs. 
Q I notice that you have down there diagnosis of 
Brachial neuritis? 
A Tine Brachial Plexus is here the lower cervical 
and thoracic region and the nerves that they exit the spinal 
column if they are irritated we through our test findings 
if they are positive they indicate that neuritis neuralgia, 
irritation of the nerve tissue. 
Q So it is irritation of the nerve tissue itself? 
A Yes. 
et 
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A I don't know. I will have to look it up. He was 
treated at the Murray Park Chiropractic Office on 5/26/78 
mainly a sprain of the lumbar spine in the lower back. 
Q In order to short circuit all of this, Your Honor. 
Let me ask you what was the last time that you treated 
Mr. Davis prior to May 26, 1988? 
A The last time I treated him according to my records 
to my knowledge was April 6, 1984. 
Q Okay have you formed an opinion as to whether 
or not any of the injuries that you treated Mr. Davis 
for prior to April 6, 1984 had been resolved? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was your opinion? 
A It was my opinion they were temporary and they were 
resolved and he had no further care. He was doing fine. 
Q As I understand your testimony to be then that since 
April 6, 1984 until May 26, 1988 approximately four years 
(you had not treated Mr. Davis is that correct? 
A I did not no. 
Q Showing you what has been marked as Exhibit No. 39 
(indicating) can you identify that please? 
A This is what I prepared in preparation for a depositio 
bs to treatments prior to his auto accident at my office 
(according to my records. 
Q And it just indicates how many times he saw you and 
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conservative treatment measures to help him deal with 
his problem. 
Q Now the surgery was performed on the right knee 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you identify Exhibit No. 53 (indicating) 
please? 
A This is a letter addressed to Dr. David Beck in resporjs 
to his inquiries regarding Mr. Davis. 
Q And does that contain your diagnosis of Mr. Davis' 
problem? 
A It contains a brief synopsis. 
Q Now Dr. Rosenberg have you an opinion as to 
whether or not any of the injuries for which you 
treated Mr. Davis was caused by the automobile accident 
or aggravated by the automobile accident? 
A Yes. 
Q And what is that opinion? 
A My opinion is that the ligament insufficiency, the 
cartilage tears pre-dated the accident. 
Q Was any of the damarg^ e or any of the injuries that you 
observed in treating or examing Mr. Davis caused by the 
accident in your opinion? 
A It is my opinion' that the accident may have aggravated! 
the cartilage injury that was already present in Mr. Davis' 
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Q Would it surprise you that Dr. Rosenberg 
found that or placed a percentage on the problems 
with Mr. Davis' knees aggravation at 20 percent? 
A I would disairee with that. 
Q In fact you would disagree that there would be 
any type of long term aggravation caused to Mr. Davis' 
knees is that correct? 
A Well I think that I clarified that in our deposition, 
I stated categorically that at most there would be 10 to 
15 per cent. In thinking of that I just feel that even that 
was probably more generous then reality. 
Q We would ask that Dr. Rosenberg's notes, deposition 
be published, or Dr. Smith's deposition be published? 
THE COURT: Do you have any objections? 
MR. HANSEN: None. 
MR. PEARCE: No. 
THE COURT: Dr. Smith's deposition will be 
publi shed. 
BY MR. FISHER: 
Q Dr. Smith I am going to read the question and I 
would like you to read the answer. 
A Okay. 
Q When you say aggravation can you tell from here 
how much of that may have been caused by the aggravation from 
the accident would you read your answer please? 
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Rosenberg's f ind ings to be tha t there was no swel l ing 'in trie 
knees? 
A No that isn't what I said. I said that they were 
consistent with the instability that was present. 
Q I also understand your testimony that you did no 
orthopedic or neurological tests on Mr. Davis 1 
back or neck is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q So the opinions that you expressed is without the 
opportunity to examine or to perform those tests on-Hr. 
Davis is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Also when you were referring to the neuritis, 
excuse me the radiculitis the answer, your response 
to this would be based upon your seeing Mr. Davis three years 
after the accident is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Now I understand that you did some range of 
motion tests on Mr. Davis' knees? 
A I think we discussed that in the deposition. 
Q Wasn't it in your testimony just a few minutes ago 
that you did range of motion tests? 
A I did. 
Q Did you use the inclinometer to measure? 
A No I did not. 
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\ MR. HANSEN: Let's just start and read that whole 
2 answer again. 
3 THE WITNESS: In answering your question let us assum^ 
4 that Dr. Burton's diagnosis was correct that it was a strain, 
5 That strain should have healed reasonably well in about two 
6 monthsor that would have put him back to pre-injury status. 
7 Now since we didn't have that two months, we don't know 
8 whether that is true or not. Just statistically I am 
9 saying that the probabilities are that from two or even at 
to the longest three months with a strain in a close to normal 
11 knee. Now when you go to this man's knee which already has 
12 the complex tears in it. If he began to have let's say he was} 
13 asymptomatic a full month before. He limited his activities 
14 and in that particular period of time he started to have 
15 symptoms post-accident and that heightened his deisre 
16 to go ahead and have it looked at and treated it 
17 surgically. In that you can say that is an aggravation. 
18 Q The question I probably had you read more then 
19 you needed to there. At the time of your deposition 
20 did you render an opinion as to the length of time that 
21 aggravation would, or excuse me the duration of that 
22 aggravation? 
23 MR. FISHER: I want to make sure that I am understandi 
24 |You are asking him that at the time you gave this answer? 
25 I MR. HANSEN: I am asking him if his testimony then 
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Then there is a rotational component which is also 
measured . It is measured in kind of an awkward position 
but yet it is how much rotation, the shoulders rotate 
on the hips. That was measured at 20 degrees in both 
sides also for another 1 per cent impairment. 
Q Okay, and did you what was the total of the thoracic i\ 
of motion? 
A The thoracic rante of motion would be 4 per cent 
then. 
Q Is that to be added to your total body impairment 
that you did? 
A That would be combined using the chart. 
Q All right have you done that or could you do that 
right now? 
A I can do that just taking the spine without the 
knees, 17 plus the 4 would be 20 per cent. 
Q And with the knee? 
A With the knee 20 plus the 5 would be 24 per cent. 
Q Your Honor we would move for the admission of 
xhibit No. 59 and 60? 
THE COURT: You have already done that. We have 
[already received them. 
BY MR. FISHER: 
ar 
Q Just so we have a little background, you mentioned 
la 100 per cent then someone would be dead, when is a person 
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that the problems that he was experiencing were from the 
accident he had. 
Q Now you stated that you hadn't seen him since 
1986? 
A Right. 
Q Were you able to determine whether or not the 
complaints that Mr. Davis Had when he came to see you aftd 
the accident were involved injuries that were different to l) 
injuries you treated him for prior to 1986? 
A Well, in 1986 he came in for a low back adjustment. 
I just saw him that one time during the year. It was not 
as significant or severe as what I had been treating him 
the last four years. 
Q You have an opinion as to whether or not 
the complaints or the problems that Mr. or the injuries 
excuse me that Mr. Davis saw you for prior to May of 1988 
were the same injuries that he saw you for after May of 
1988? 
A Absolutely not no. 
Q You don't have an opinion or they were not the same? 
A Well they were not the same particular problems. 
[He was showing a few other problems. He was complaining of 
some tingling down the legs, numbness which was more severe 
(then when he came. He just came in for a back adjustment 
in 1986. 
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about initially during those months of intense emotional 
trauma experienced by Mr. Davis during the time when there 
was a threat to the adoption stability of the adoption 
of one of his children. The nature of post traumatic 
stress disorder however, is such that once you have 
experienced a traumatic event, another traumatic event 
occurring in the future exacerbates it. It causes a 
resurgence of those old post traumatic stress symptoms. 
Yes I have in answer to your question, yes I believe that th 
post traumatic stress disorder came about from that 
significant trauma through the adoption process, I believe 
that it was exacerbated significantly by the accident itself. 
Q Has there been other stresses in Mr. Davis' 
life that you are aware of that would have added stress 
to the post traumatic stress syndrome? 
A Yes there certainly have, 
Q And what are they? 
A In addition to his problem with the adoption, this 
secondary problem with the automobile accident, Mr. Davis 
was, I believe confronted once he came to me and talked 
about a confrontation between himself and the FBI with 
them investigating something, There was a confrontation 
I believe , and I seem to recall, between him and the 
Security and Exchange Commission. Then down the road there 
was another extremely traumatic event when his home was to be 
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you look ahead to a case of this kind, we are looking at 
maybe five years medication here and that will cost 
a little over $6,040.00. 
Travel for treatment - -
Q Maybe we perhaps could short cut this a little bit. 
do you have a total? 
A Yes I do. 
Q What is that? 
A $26,140.00. 
Q Now that is for all of his treatment is that correct? 
A That is for all treatment. 
Q What per cent of that would you determine to be as a 
result of the accident? 
A I would relate 10 to 40 per cent a range there 
because Mr. Davis is a very complex case somewhere between 
10 and 40 percent of that figure. 
Q Thank you. That is all I have. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pearce, you may Cross Examine. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PEARCE: 
Q I believe you have stated Dr. Ghant that you first 
saw Mr. Davis in August of 1990 is that correct? 
A I believe that was the date that I first saw him. 
Q Now at that time, did you take what is equivalent of 
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A Right in a lay sense of it right. 
Q Did you also determine a psychological impairment for 
Mr. Davis? 
A In what sense do you mean psychological impairment? 
Q Rating? 
A A rating. I was asked in the deposition to give 
a rating and that is the only one I did. 
Q And what was that? 
A About 7 per cent. 
Q Explain the difference why you have 10 per cent 
of the total emotional distress and 7 per cent rating? 
A Well, as we would think of it, most of us would 
think of it as a 100 per cent means that you were totally 
diabled to do anything. In a medical sense if you are 
50 per cent diabled you are very close to unemployable, 
probably can't do very much. So that the category specified 
by the, you know the set of definitions , the impairments 
are rated in terms of severity, usually in groups fairly 
gross groups like 5 or 6 different groups, mild and like 
none, mild, moderate, moderately severe and ^/ery severe 
type groups. Then you as a clinician have to either 
follow the guideline if there is a specific guideline if 
they give you or you have to do your best guess. You know 
here is an objective impression of what that impairment is. 
Q Okay, now does that 7 per cent is that the same as 
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